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ABSTRACT
The European Union (EU) has had a profound eﬀect upon its members’
environmental policy. Even in the United Kingdom (UK), the EU’s most recalci-
trant member state (historically labeled the ‘Dirty man of Europe’), environ-
mental policy has been Europeanised. As the UK moves to the EU’s exit door it
is timely to assess the utility of Europeanisation for understanding policy
dynamics in the UK. Drawing upon interviews and extensive engagement
with stakeholders, this article analyses the potential impact of Brexit upon
environmental policy and politics. The analytical toolkit oﬀered by de-
Europeanisation is developed to identify the factors that drive and inhibit de-
Europeanisation processes, thereby providing insights that may be applicable
in other settings. Disengagement and policy stagnation are presented as more
likely environmental outcomes of Brexit, with capacity emerging as a central
explanatory variable.
KEYWORDS Brexit; capacity; de-Europeanisation; European Union environmental policy; United
Kingdom; policy dismantling
Introduction
Until recently, scholars have assumed that Europeanisation and the devel-
opment of the European Union’s (EU’s) environmental acquis communau-
taire were largely top down, uni-directional, expansionary and positive for
environmental outcomes. The conglomerate of crises (Falkner 2016) that
has recently beset the EU has challenged these assumptions (Zito et al.
2019). Since the publication of this journal’s 1992 Special Issue on the EU
and environmental policy (Judge 1992), academics have depicted the EU as
a positive inﬂuence on United Kingdom (UK) environmental policy, which
they typically describe as being Europeanised (Lowe and Ward 1998; Jordan
2002, 2004). The UK has downloaded numerous pieces of legislation1 and
the EU has become part of the daily business of UK environmental
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stakeholders and policy-makers. The UK’s anticipated exit from the EU
(‘Brexit’) consequently poses important analytical and empirical challenges
to the literatures on Europeanisation and EU and UK environmental policy.
The concepts of dismantling (Gravey and Jordan 2016; Steinebach and
Knill 2017) and de-Europeanisation (Copeland 2016) are emerging as key
analytical tools for understanding the current and likely future trajectory of
EU environmental policy. Here, we build upon these terms and the emer-
ging de-Europeanisation literature to oﬀer an original assessment of the
likely implications of Brexit for the UK and for our wider understanding of
Europeanisation. At the time of writing, Brexit negotiations are ongoing,
the ﬁnal outcome is unknown. Despite this uncertainty and, recognising
that Brexit represents an extreme example of possible de-Europeanisation,
we contend that Brexit reﬂects a wider movement to reduce and limit the
EU’s inﬂuence on its Member States. Drawing upon Hogwood and Peters
(1982) insight that current and past policies are likely to shape future
policies, we argue that, in the short term, Brexit’s immediate impact is
likely to be limited, but over the longer term a wider divergence between
the EU and UK is likely, with the prospect of UK environmental policy
stagnating. Our work chimes with the emerging ﬁndings of the dismantling
literature: we see little evidence that deliberate de-Europeanisation of envir-
onmental policy will follow Brexit, but suggest a longer process of disen-
gagement is likely.
The following sections review the state of the art on the Europeanisation
of UK environmental policy and then analyse the referendum campaign
and its aftermath, to determine the variables likely to shape de-
Europeanisation. Our research draws upon a review of primary and sec-
ondary documentary sources, interviews with key political actors drawn
from diﬀerent party backgrounds and evidence gathered from eight stake-
holder workshops carried out between 2015 and 2018 involving represen-
tatives from environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs), civil
servants and parliamentary oﬃcials from across the UK. The workshops
operated under Chatham House rules so we report ﬁndings without direct
attribution to the individuals concerned.
We make three principal contributions. First, theoretically we reﬁne and
extend current work on de-Europeanisation and identify key variables
shaping the patterns of behaviour from which we can draw analytical
generalisations that can be tested in other national and policy
settings. Second, we use original interview and extensive stakeholder
engagement data to provide robust evidence to underpin our analysis.
Third, we oﬀer one of the ﬁrst and most extensive political analyses of
the implications of Brexit for UK and EU environmental policy and politics.
We thereby provide comprehensive analysis of one aspect of Brexit and use
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this case to explore and engage with wider, important debates in the public
policy and Europeanisation literatures.
Europeanisation, de-Europeanisation and disengagement
The mushrooming of Europeanisation studies generated a ‘bewilderingly
large array of deﬁnitions’ (Jordan and Lieﬀerink 2004, p. 5); here we draw
upon those proposed by Radaelli (2004) and Börzel and Risse (2003).
Radaelli (2004) suggests that Europeanisation consists of processes of con-
struction, diﬀusion and institutionalisation of ‘formal and informal rules,
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared
beliefs and norms which are ﬁrst deﬁned and consolidated in the EU policy
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and
subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies’ (p. 3).
Börzel and Risse (2003) use a threefold typology of the EU’s impact upon
a state’s policy, politics and polity. Here ‘policy’ refers to the broader policy
paradigm and speciﬁc policy goals and instruments; ‘politics’ includes the
engagement of civil society, business actors, parties and the wider public
with Europeanisation processes; and ‘polity’ centres on relations between
levels of government and formal institutional structures, including admin-
istrative capacity and accountability, both within the UK and in the EU.
Early Europeanisation studies generally focused upon the EU’s impact
upon states, and, whilst retrenchment and resistance to the EU have long
been part of the analytical debates about Europeanisation there have been
relatively few examples of states actively trying to roll back EU policies at the
national level. More recently, we have seen emerging debates around dis-
mantling EU policy (Bauer et al. 2012; Jordan et al. 2013; Gravey and Jordan
2016) and studies elaborating the concept of de-Europeanisation
(Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016; Copeland 2016; Raagmaa et al. 2014).
Essentially de-Europeanisation amounts to dismantling EU policy at the
domestic level, where dismantling means the ‘cutting, diminution or removal
of existing policy’ (Jordan et al. 2013, p. 795). Copeland (2016) suggests that
a key analytical component of de-Europeanisation is that it is intentional with
‘the speciﬁc aim to reverse the process of Europeanisation and to prevent
future uploading and down-loading in the governance process’ (2016,
p. 1126). Signiﬁcantly, he distinguishes de-Europeanisation from disengage-
ment; the latter involves a state retreating from active Europeanisation,
maintaining the domestic processes and structures aﬀected by
Europeanisation, but not seeking to adapt them further to the EU’s inﬂuence.
This conceptual distinction is useful in the Brexit context. The act of
leaving the EU clearly constitutes an intention to de-Europeanise. However,
it does not follow that the UK will actively dismantle the governance
processes and policies established as a consequence of EU membership.
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If, as a result of Brexit, the British government chooses to leave the vast
majority of EU environmental (or indeed any other) policy in place, then,
despite no longer being an EU member, UK policy may be disengaged
rather than de-Europeanised. This description would be particularly apt in
those policy sectors, such as environment, where the UK is likely to have to
align with EU policy in order to trade with the EU 27, even though the
opportunity to upload policy will no longer be available. Consequently, our
endeavour is partly to determine the likelihood of active and deliberate
attempts to reverse the Europeanisation of UK environmental policy, i.e.
the active dismantling (Gravey and Jordan 2016) of the environmental
acquis within the UK.
Copeland (2016) identiﬁes two conditions shaping the level and extent of
de-Europeanisation. First, the degree to which policy is centralised: policy
decided by central government involves fewer veto players making it easier
to reverse. Second, the level of domestic political support for the policy.
Copeland argues that in the case of EU employment policy the levels of
public knowledge and active support were limited, which resulted in less
contestation when the policy was rolled back. Conversely, where there is
a higher level of knowledge and popular support we should expect de-
Europeanisation to prove more challenging. Synthesising Copeland’s (2016)
and Börzel and Risse (2003) work (see Table 1), we anticipate that, where
Europeanisation processes have led to limited changes, de-Europeanisation
will be easier to achieve; conversely, where Europeanisation has been more
deep-seated, de-Europeanisation will be more diﬃcult and hence disen-
gagement more likely.
The following section provides a succinct review of the state of the art on
the Europeanisation of UK environmental policy. We then explore the
referendum campaign and its immediate aftermath to determine the like-
lihood of de-Europeanisation, and the patterns that may emerge in the light
of our expectations.
Europeanising the UK’s environment
Prior to the UK referendum there had been relatively few up-to-date
academic analyses of UK environmental policy. Reviews of speciﬁc policies
were produced, especially on climate change and energy policy following
the UK’s pioneering Climate Change Act (Carter and Jacobs 2014;
Lorenzoni and Benson 2014; Lockwood 2013), but analyses of broader UK-
EU policy dynamics were notable by their absence, which reﬂected the
relative stability of UK environmental policy and the academic consensus
that UK environmental policy had been Europeanised (Lowe and Ward
1998; Jordan 2002). Below we review what this meant in relation to policy,
politics and polity.
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Table 1. Expectations of de-Europeanisation.
Europeanisation Policy Politics Polity De-Europeanisation
Limited impact of
the EU
Voluntary policy goals have resulted in
limited or few policy changes,
governance changes or cognitive
shifts amongst policy-makers.
Limited awareness of policy
outside government.
Limited engagement of wider
societal actors.
Centralized policy-making.
Limited veto players.
Low public awareness.
Likely and uncontested.
Stronger impact of
the EU
Mandatory changes that have resulted
in signiﬁcant policy changes and
infrastructural investment.
Mobilization of business and
societal interests in favour
of policy.
Wider social and business
expectations coalesced
around EU
policy.
Contestation.
Devolved policy area.
Multiple veto players.
Higher public awareness.
Unlikely or more contested. Disengagement
likely characterised by limited roll back of
policy and mirroring of EU policy even
though no longer a member.
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Policy
When the UK joined the EU, UK environmental policy making was ad hoc,
reactive, and based upon end-of-pipe solutions (Weale et al. 2000, p. 177).
Implementation was patchy, favouring a voluntarist approach that relied
upon negotiated consent (Lowe and Ward 1998). This policy style was
completely at odds with that favoured by the ‘green pioneers’ (Denmark,
the Netherlands and Germany). These states uploaded domestic models to
the European level to minimise their downstream implementation costs
(Börzel 2002). Thus, the UK persistently found itself having to implement
policies designed for other political systems, most often the more inﬂexible
and legalistic German policymaking system (Wurzel 2006). Consequently,
EU membership prompted the development in the UK of a more organised,
proactive and integrated environmental policy based upon clear and
enforceable targets. However, Jordan (2004) suggests that the extent to
which the UK environmental policy paradigm shifted is debateable: in
some areas, such as water and air, the EU’s impact was more extensive
than in others, such as land use planning (Wurzel 2006; Cowell and Owens
2016). Hence, the patterns of Europeanisation across the sector varied.
Nevertheless, over timeUKpolicymakers gradually learnt to ‘think European’
(Jordan 2003, p. 263), as the government and civil servants sought to adapt to the
challenge of policymaking in Brussels. From the 1990s onwards, UK actors
sought, in certain policy areas, to set the EU’s agenda, both by leading and
blocking action. For example, the UK blocked major Commission proposals on
environmental taxation and soil protection. In the early 1990s, the UK tried to
shape the EU policy agenda in a range of ways. It sought to advance its voluntary
policy approach, but met with limited success. UK attempts to shape the types of
instruments used by the EU, by advancing the use of more market-based
approaches such as environmental auditing and eco-labels, and integrated
pollution control were better received (Jordan 2002; Haigh 2015). The UK also
started to push for greater attention to be paid to the regulatory burdens (or ‘red
tape’) of environmental action. This agenda became central to UK European
policy, from Labour, which put ‘better regulation’ at the heart of its 2005
Presidency of the Council of the EU (House of Lords 2005), to the
Conservatives. ‘Cutting EU red tape’ was also a core part of the 2010–2015
coalition government’s EU strategy (Business Taskforce 2013) and it became one
of David Cameron’s four negotiation objectives when he set out to reform the
EU Treaties prior to the 2016 Brexit referendum (Cameron 2015).
Politics
EU membership has shaped the strategies of various domestic actors (includ-
ing non-government organisations (NGOs), businesses and to a lesser extent
276 C. BURNS ET AL.
political parties). ENGOs have learned how to use EU governance structures to
hold theUK government to account (Haigh 2015). For example, they contested
UK attempts to minimise compliance costs of the Bathing Water Directive by
designating only 27 bathing areas (Jordan 1997). The EU also provided fund-
ing for ENGOs and provided a platform for pan-European collaboration
(Berny 2016). UK-based ENGOs have been central to the creation of EU-
level ENGOs, which have inﬂuenced European policymaking (Berny 2008).
Moreover, UK ENGOs and think-tanks have directly shaped EU policymak-
ing, notably on integrated pollution control (Haigh 2015) and agricultural
reform (Fouilleux and Ansaloni 2016).
UK businesses have also engaged with the EU’s environment agenda.
The desire to reduce costs and uncertainty for businesses has been a key
driver of EU environmental policy. The Stern Review (Stern 2006), which
made the case for ambitious climate policy, attracted wide business support
in favour of EU climate regulations (Carter and Jacobs 2014). However,
some companies and types of business continue to rail against Brussels ‘red
tape’. Developers have consistently identiﬁed the habitats and birds direc-
tives as imposing costs upon them. Farmers have levelled similar criticisms
at EU pesticide regulations (National Farmers’ Union 2017).
For the ﬁrst 30 years of the UK’s EU membership, the two main
parties did not directly compete over the environment (Carter 2006).
However, in the mid-2000s, the Conservative party sought to rebrand
itself by embracing the environment as a way to ‘detoxify’ its image
(Carter 2009). Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives
competed ﬁercely over climate change policies, leading to the adoption
of the 2008 Climate Change Act (Carter and Jacobs 2014), which
eventually proved divisive within the Conservative Party. The govern-
ment’s eﬀorts to meet its EU renewables targets prompted internal
opposition, particularly to onshore wind farms and green duties on
energy bills (Carter and Clements 2015). Similarly, Conservative
Chancellor George Osborne, identiﬁed the EU Habitats Directive as
‘placing ridiculous costs on businesses’ (Osborne 2011). Growing cli-
mate scepticism and opposition on the right to environmental regula-
tions connected directly with and drew much strength from the
powerful anti-EU lobby within the party.
Of UK political parties, the Greens have most obviously beneﬁtted
from EU membership. Since the introduction of proportional represen-
tation for European elections, the Greens have consistently secured
representation of at least two Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs). They have used their MEPs to build their domestic proﬁle
and secure further support (Bomberg and Carter 2006). For example,
party co-chair Caroline Lucas used her stint as an MEP as a springboard
to become a Westminster MP.
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Polity
Whilst the EU has profoundly inﬂuenced the type of environmental
policies implemented in the UK, the use of directives, ‘orientated
towards the ends to be achieved, rather than the means of achievement’
(Bulmer and Jordan 2016, p. 9), has limited the EU’s impact on domestic
government. Rather, EU membership triggered a long and slow trans-
formation within UK government to enable it to deal with its European
neighbours (Burch and Bulmer 2005). Hence, whilst there has been
reorganisation of government structures within the UK, particularly for
environmental policy,2 these changes have largely been driven by domes-
tic concerns and it is challenging to disentangle the eﬀect of
Europeanisation from other processes (Bulmer and Jordan 2016;
Jordan 2002). The most signiﬁcant changes have occurred at the inter-
section of polity and policy where the act of pooling sovereignty has led
to a pooling of capacity across EU states. Thus, several EU agencies are
responsible for giving advice and administering EU rules, which means
that EU states do not have to maintain equivalent structures at the
domestic level.
The EU has also provided governance architecture to support policy
development and implementation, including networks to exchange best
practice such as the EU Network for the Implementation and
Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL). For example, the UK gov-
ernment is obliged to report on a whole range of policy activities, with the
data made publicly available, as in the case of bathing waters. Furthermore,
if the government fails to report regularly or to implement EU policies it
can be held to account in national courts and see itself pursued at EU level.
EU membership has consequently had a profound impact both upon the
substantive norms underpinning environmental policy (what the rules are)
and upon institutional norms (who enacts policy) (Roger 2016).
Furthermore, whilst EU membership has not profoundly aﬀected gov-
ernment structures, the UK’s devolution settlements have led to changes
that EU membership has augmented. Currently, the EU sets minimum
levels for environmental policy. Member states can diverge from them
(under Article 193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU—the so-
called environmental guarantee), but only by pursuing higher environmen-
tal standards. The combined eﬀects of Article 193 and the devolution
settlements have allowed policy divergence to emerge within the UK
where policies go further than the EU prescribed minimum (Hunt et al.
2016; Reid 2016). Consequently, Wales and Scotland have adopted more
ambitious climate change policies than England (Royles and McEwen
2015); Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, have banned the cultivation
of GMOs, but England has not (Coghlan 2015).
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The referendum campaign and its aftermath:
de-Europeanisation?
Overall we can see that policy, politics and polity have all been Europeanised,
although the patterns and depth of that Europeanisation has varied. Below
we review evidence from the referendum campaign and its aftermath (using
our three categories) to determine the extent to which a demand for de-
Europeanisation has existed, and, if so, the factors shaping it.
De-Europeanised policy?
A vocal lobby has emerged in the UK that favours rolling back EU legisla-
tion; Brexit has been presented as a golden opportunity to remove legisla-
tion that this group views as problematic, most notably the habitats and
birds directives, which have become the bête verte of the conservative right
(Environment Analyst 2016). Indeed, a key theme emerging from our
stakeholder events was a deep fear that these two directives will face
amendment or be removed after Brexit. Wildlife NGOs view UK legislation
as oﬀering weaker protections than its EU equivalent.3 Michael Gove,
appointed Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Aﬀairs
in Summer 2017, committed himself to the pursuit of a green Brexit, stating
that there would be no weakening of standards post-Brexit (Gove 2017).
However, the Department for International Trade will lead negotiations to
secure post-Brexit trade deals. A clear fear that stakeholders expressed was
that future trade deals would see products coming into the UK subjected to
lower standards, leading to downward pressure upon domestic standards.
Moreover, several interviewees, whilst welcoming a committed environ-
ment minister, were concerned that Mr Gove would not remain long in
post, potentially leaving the environment vulnerable to the appointment of
a less environmentally committed minister (Interviews 11/08/17; 07/09/17;
25/09/17). These comments ﬂag a key concern that the previously stable
policy regime emanating from Brussels could, when repatriated, be subject
to domestic political variation (Interview 07/09/17). Stakeholders also
expressed concern that the UK faces a reassertion of the voluntarist, ﬂexible
policy style preferred prior to the UK’s EU membership, and still apparent
in some areas such as planning (Cowell and Owens 2016).
To pave the way to Brexit the UK parliament has adopted an EU
Withdrawal Act (EUWA), which has also led to concerns about environ-
mental policy dismantling. When the UK joined the EU, it adopted the
1972 European Communities Act (ECA) to give eﬀect to its obligations as
an EU member state. In the UK, national implementing measures give
directives legal eﬀect; however, article 2(2) of the ECA gives regulations
eﬀect without any speciﬁc implementing legislation. Consequently, when
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the ECA ceases to apply, national measures adopted to give eﬀect to
directives would remain in place but regulations would cease to apply,
potentially creating numerous regulatory gaps. To address this problem,
the EUWA retains all existing EU rules and regulations in national law to
prevent legal uncertainty in the short term.
This approach contains an assumption that at some point the vast array of
laws adopted to give eﬀect to EU obligations will be reviewed, and decisions
made about whether they should be maintained or scrapped, raising the risk of
policy dismantling. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Aﬀairs
(Defra) is the second most heavily aﬀected department by the EUWA, with the
EU aﬀecting approximately 80% of its work (National Audit Oﬃce 2017).
There is an expectation that Defra will need to bring forward 95 statutory
instruments to implement the EUWA, and two new domestic bills on agri-
culture and ﬁsheries to replace the Common Agriculture and Common
Fisheries policies (National Audit Oﬃce 2017). The scale of work Defra and
other departments face is likely to mitigate against an immediate and wide-
spread roll back of EU environmental policy. Equally, however, there is a risk
that the Withdrawal Act has failed to suﬃciently address regulatory gaps, or
will leave unanticipated gaps within UK environmental governance. The fact
that the EUWA, as originally framed, failed to copy over environmental
principles from the EU treaties into UK law, such as the protection, precau-
tionary and polluter pays principles, was identiﬁed by ENGOs as problematic.
They campaigned vigorously on the issue leading the government to bring
forward a consultation on environmental governance and principles (DEFRA
2018a) and the House of Commons adopted an amendment to the EUWA
requiring the government to bring forward a Bill enshrining environmental
principles (House of Commons 2018). However, the amendment to the
EUWA does not demand the pursuit of a higher level of environmental
protection, as required by the EU Treaties (see House of Commons 2018).
Moreover, the EUWA aﬀords a good deal of discretion to government
ministers to change laws without proper parliamentary scrutiny. One inter-
viewee expressed concern that ministers would not be able to avoid the
temptation to change laws and could do so without scrutiny and in ways
that might appear minor but could be signiﬁcant in scope, by, for example,
removing all future reporting requirements from EU legislation being
copied over (Interview 7/09/17).
Finally, it is worth noting that Brexit has implications for EU-level policy
dynamics. The UK has been a strong advocate of higher ambition in areas
such as climate change in the EU Council; Brexit may weaken the EU’s
ability to promote higher international standards (Interviews 07/09/17; 25/
09/17). Conversely, the UK has also led calls to cut EU regulatory burdens;
Brexit will test whether better regulation is merely an ‘Anglo-Saxon obses-
sion’ (House of Lords 2005, p. 21). Brexit also constitutes one more policy
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challenge that the EU must face in its crowded policy agenda, raising the
prospect that the environment will be pushed further down the list of policy
priorities (Burns and Tobin 2016; Slominski 2016).
De-Europeanised politics?
ENGOs responded rapidly and robustly to Brexit by launching a Greener UK
campaign and mobilising to call for a New Nature Protection Act to preserve
and develop environmental protections (Greener UK 2017). When appointed,
Michael Gove moved quickly to secure ENGO support by meeting with key
personnel (Interview 31/08/17). However, it remains to be seen whether
ENGOs will be able to maintain a high level of issue salience across such
a wide range of issues. In the past, British ENGOs have also played a substantial
role in supporting ENGOs in other EU member states (Hofmann 2019).
Although this role may not completely disappear after Brexit, UK ENGOs
may well be tempted to focus their energies on holding the line in the UK. Here
the level of public awareness and the ability of ENGOs to mobilise the public
will be central. Evidence suggests that the British continue to care about the
environment. Prior to the referendum, 47% of the British public claimed to
support more EU integration in environment and climate policy
(Vasilopoulou 2015), and 46% supported a call for UK environmental protec-
tions to be stronger post-Brexit (YouGov 2016).
Of the main political parties, key Labour voices have emerged on the
environment, most notably Sadiq Khan, the Mayor of London. Khan (2017)
has sought to exploit London’s poor air quality as a political issue. Labour
garnered support from younger voters (60% of 18–24-year olds voted
Labour) in the 2017 election (Holder et al. 2017); one strategy it may
employ to win power is to use the environment agenda to create space
between the Conservative and Labour parties. Commentators have sug-
gested that the need to attract younger voters partly explains why the
Conservative government published its long awaited 25-year environment
plan (25YEP) in January 2018 (Steﬀani and Cooper 2018). Hence, whilst the
environment did not feature much in the referendum, Brexit has seen
a growing politicisation over environmental issues.
Within industry, the picture is even less clear. The Confederation of
British Industry (CBI) has generally supported EU membership and the
EU’s green growth agenda. Concerns exist about the implications of Brexit
for diﬀerent UK economic sectors—leading to calls for a ‘whole economy’
approach (CBI 2016). Business has also expressed concern about uncer-
tainty, especially over energy and product regulations (House of Commons
2017a). Sectors, such as chemical production, that are heavily reliant on EU
rules to trade with the Single Market have been especially vocal about
ensuring regulatory certainty. The UK government has indicated its desire
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to establish its own set of procedures and a new, national chemicals agency
(DEFRA 2018b). However, MPs have emphasised that, to ensure frictionless
trade into the Single Market, the pragmatic option is to abide by current EU
product standards (even though the UK would have no role in determining
them) and to accept EU regulatory oversight (House of Commons 2017b).
De-Europeanised polity?
The chemicals example highlights a much bigger issue: to what extent will
actors within the polity still be able to draw upon the knowledge that has
been pooled with EU partners? This question goes well beyond the chemi-
cals sector to include a much larger number of trade substances (e.g.
genetically modiﬁed organisms, foodstuﬀs, plastic waste). The expected
loss of access to expertise combined with the civil service’s diminished
size, despite recent appointments, raises the risk that, whilst immediate
wide-scale policy dismantling may not occur, signiﬁcant national policy
innovation is also unlikely.
Ironically, given the EU’s limited direct impact upon how the UK
government operates, Brexit is raising signiﬁcant constitutional challenges
to the existing relationship between diﬀerent government tiers within the
UK. The UK Government announced that the Withdrawal Act would
provide delegated statutory powers to ‘enable Ministers to adjust the
acquis to ﬁt the outcome of the negotiation’ (Caird 2016, p. 24). This
highlights the issue of veto players and the balance of power between the
executive and legislative branches, and between Westminster and the
devolved nations. It is unclear who will be responsible for sorting through
the hastily carried over swathe of EU legislation. It remains to be seen
whether ministers will be able to dismantle environmental policy through
administrative channels, without parliamentary scrutiny (House of Lords
2017). There is also ongoing uncertainty about how UK-wide agreements
on future environmental policy will be designed. The wording of the
Withdrawal Act caused controversy between the UK government and
the devolved administrations as the UK government suggested it would
decide which policies would be devolved post-Brexit, which the Welsh
and Scottish governments characterised as a power grab. In 2018 the
Scottish government refused its consent to the EUWA and started pre-
paring rival (‘continuity’) legislation (Scottish Government 2018).
A major constitutional crisis is brewing between the UK polities over
who has the right to decide on common UK environmental frameworks
post-Brexit (Petetin 2018).
These polity-related issues may interact with politics as the veto players
in the devolved nations form alliances with other actors to contest de-
Europeanisation of environmental policy. One possible outcome is
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increasingly divergent policy patterns across the UK regions (once common
EU rules are removed) (Reid 2015) and thus more varied patterns of (de)
Europeanisation. A key limitation that the devolved nations face in pursu-
ing diﬀerent policy goals from the UK is their relatively weak capacity and
expertise. Thus the UK faces the challenge of disentangling itself from the
EU acquis and developing new patterns to share competence and develop
policy across the UK nations, all under a severely constrained administra-
tive capacity at every governance level. The government announced cuts to
Defra’s budget of 15% in real terms between 2015 and 2020; the Royal
Society for the Protection of Birds and the Wildlife Trusts argue that Defra
has borne some of the biggest cuts across the whole of Whitehall (Howard
2015). Whilst the government has since spent £2 billion in getting
Whitehall ready for Brexit, extra funding for Defra has only partially oﬀset
previous and planned cuts, with staﬃng back to its 2011 level (Owen et al.
2018). Local government, which is often tasked with implementing envir-
onmental policy on the ground, has faced an equivalent level of budgetary
restriction, with no extra Brexit preparation funding; these actors have
hotly contested the availability of council policy instruments and budgetary
resources, for instance to implement the 2017 national plan to improve
town and city air quality (Merrick 2017).
Concerning governance capacity more broadly, a key risk of the EUWA is
that laws pasted into the UK statute book may remain in place with no
governance or legal infrastructure to support them. For example, the Water
Framework Directive has reporting requirements obliging states to send
regular updates on how they implement the directive. Such obligations may
no longer apply to the UK; currently no detailed plans exist to replace these
reporting requirements at the domestic level. Additionally, actors can cur-
rently pursue the government through the Courts for failing to implement
EU legislation and ultimately in front of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU). Thus, Client Earth successfully took the UK government to
court for failing to implement air quality laws (Client Earth 2017). Once the
UK leaves the EU that ability to rely upon the accountability and legal
infrastructure enshrined by the EU to enforce legislation will no longer
apply (House of Lords 2016). The government’s 25YEP committed to bring-
ing forward a new environmental watchdog for England to address these
concerns, but its scope and power, and relationship to equivalent bodies in
the devolved nations remain uncertain (DEFRA 2018b).
De-Europeanisation after Brexit?
Do these post-referendum discussions imply that the UK is moving towards
a period of de-Europeanisation? Two broader points are worth making
upfront. First, disentangling the UK from the EU will be challenging; if there
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is de-Europeanisation, it is unlikely to be rapid. One obvious exception would
be if the UK fails to secure a deal or a suitable transition period, which could
have signiﬁcant eﬀects in those policy areas where the UK relies upon EU
expertise, and is unlikely to be able to put in place equivalent structures. A key
example is the nuclear energy sector where, if the UK fails to reach an
agreement with the EU, the UK may ﬁnd itself struggling to source medical
isotopes and nuclear fuel, notwithstanding the fact that the House of
Commons has adopted a nuclear safeguards bill (Institute for Government
2018). Second, the patterns of de-Europeanisation are likely to be as ‘diﬀer-
entiated’ as the patterns of Europeanisation (Jordan and Lieﬀerink 2004),
which means we need to pay careful attention to changes within and the
interactions between the policy, politics and polity dimensions.
The impact of Brexit and de-Europeanisation are consequently likely to vary:
unpicking the policy patchwork of EU membership (Héritier 1996) could be
complex and uneven. Copeland (2016) notes that the fact that employment
policy was centralised facilitated de-Europeanisation. Environmental policy,
with its messier, devolved structure will prove more resistant. In policy areas
where Europeanisation is most profound, divergence may only emerge over the
longer term. Given the EU’s ability to impose its product standards on non-
member states (i.e. all chemicals imported into the EU must be compliant with
the regulation on Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals
[REACH]), de-Europeanisation will be challenging. At the paradigmatic level,
given the relative resilience of the UK’s preferred policy approach (Jordan 2002),
de-Europeanisation in the form of a reassertion of the UK style of policy at the
domestic level is likely
Within the politics sphere, Brexit will shape various organisations, perhaps
forcing amore introspective focus. Businesses have startedmobilising within the
UK, and expressed concern especially about the impact on investment and
productivity (Cox et al. 2017, Savage 2017). There is scope for ongoing politici-
sation of environmental politics: what has been a technical matter decided in
Brussels may become part of domestic political debate and contestation. Clear
space between the parties emerged on the environment in the 2017 General
Election (Laville et al. 2017). An on-going attempt to stigmatise ‘EU green tape’
occurred in the run up to the referendum campaign (Interview 31/08/17). If this
campaigning continues, greater de-Europeanisation may occur. Here we depart
from Copeland who assumes that wider public engagement and contestation act
as a brake on de-Europeanisation; it may also be a driver.
Finally, on polity, the EU has had limited eﬀects but the interaction
between devolution and the EU’s environmental guarantee has opened up
the possibility of a diﬀerentiated de-Europeanisation and divergence across
the composite states of the UK.
Overall, the future patterns of environmental governance look complex;
ironically, the interaction between polity (where Europeanisation was most
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limited) and policy may make de-Europeanisation harder to achieve.
Moreover, UK-level capacity (or rather its absence) is likely to be a central
condition determining whether we see de-Europeanisation or disengagement
in the environmental policy sector. Whilst the act of leaving the EU will be
deliberate, the future patterns of policy change may end up being the result of
disengagement rather than deliberate de-Europeanisation. Future studies may
wish to distinguish between disengagement occurring where de-
Europeanisation has been tried and has failed, and disengagement due to
lack of capacity, energy, or political will. We suggest extending the de-
Europeanisation typology to encompass failed de-Europeanisation, as distinct
from passive de-Europeanisation (or qua Copeland disengagement).
Returning to Table 1, our initial expectations are being borne out—albeit
with some additional consideration of the role of capacity. A limited capacity
to roll back policy or to innovate is likely in the UK: we certainly see little
appetite for or prospect of an environmental policy renaissance in the immedi-
ate future, with all that implies for environmental outcomes (Simkins 2017).
Hence a discussion of capacity is essential when discussing the scope for de-
Europeanisation. Building upon Table 1 and our analysis, we suggest
a typology of disengagement that distinguishes between passive and failed de-
Europeanisation and identiﬁes capacity as a central variable (Table 2).
Conclusions
Brexit is the latest in a series of crises to beset the EU at a time when
environmental policy was already struggling and in some respects, in retreat.
As the UK is one of the EU’s most Euro-sceptic states, it would be easy to
assume that Brexit will herald wide-scale environmental policy dismantling at
the national level. We contend, however, that, if and when the UK leaves the
EU, this outcome is unlikely. UK policy has been profoundly Europeanised in
ways that will be diﬃcult to disentangle and completely reverse.
Table 2. Brexit as disengagement.
Expectation Policy Politics Polity
Disengagement as
passive de-
Europeanisation.
Policy stays in place and
gradually becomes out-
dated.
De-politicization
and identiﬁcation
of environment
as technical low
politics.
Lack of resources
amongst NGOs.
Lack of state capacity
to review or
retrench policy.
Disengagement as failed
de-Europeanisation
Deliberate attempts to de-
Europeanise thwarted—
policy stays as is,
gradually being
undermined via
technical adjustments.
Contestation results
in stalemate.
Brexit fatigue
sets in.
Joint-decision trap—
too many veto
players to move
either way. Policy
stasis follows.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 285
Our analysis of debates about the future of environmental policy, interviews
and stakeholder engagement leads us to expect capacity (or rather its absence)
to be a central variable. Lack of capacity means that there will be limited ability
to unpick the domestic manifestation of the EU’s environmental acquis. Yet
signiﬁcant national policy innovation is also unlikely. This ﬁnding is consis-
tent with earlier Europeanisation studies, which identiﬁed capacity as a limit
upon policy implementation (Börzel 2002). Brexit may, therefore, have
a relatively limited impact on policy outputs, but have potentially more
signiﬁcant consequences for policy outcomes, as stasis and passive environ-
mental policy dismantling emerge over the medium to long term. The politics
of the environment will be central: the UK’s vibrant ENGO sector and deep-
seated public support for protecting the environment will be crucial in deter-
mining the strength of post-Brexit environmental governance arrangements.
What are the implications for the future of EU environmental policy? In
the absence of the UK, we may see less EU-level emphasis upon ‘regulatory
burdens’ and the red tape agenda. We may also see other Euro-sceptic and
environmentally-sceptic voices emerging to replace the UK, crucially in the
area of climate change where the UK generally played an important role.
However, our analysis suggests that the EU’s impact upon its member states is
such that disentangling and unpicking eﬀects of membership is challenging,
especially in a devolved polity. Hence, rather than heralding the disintegration
of the EU and large-scale de-Europeanisation, Brexit may actually demon-
strate the resilience of Europeanisation in face of extraordinary challenges.
Returning to Hogwood and Peters (1982), we suggest that, whilst the UK is
leaving the EU, there will be extensive and sticky policy residue that even the
most committed Brexiteers will ﬁnd challenging to remove.
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